This paper studies the dynamics of housing returns in Singapore. We first extract the movements of Singapore's economic aggregates that are free from foreign (U.S. and rest of the world) factors, and then examine the determinants of its housing returns. We find that both the domestic variables (such as GDP growth rate, 
Introduction
Real estate markets played important role in recent crises, including the Asian financial crisis (AFC hereafter) in the late 1990s and the global financial crisis of 2007-09 (GFC hereafter).
1 Academics and policy makers are thus very eager to answer the following questions.
(1) What determines the real estate prices? (2) How can the real estate cycles be predicted? (3) What and can government policies do to "stabilize" real estate cycles, and how can they do it? To address these questions is clearly a non-trivial task for large economies such as the United States. 2 It may be even more difficult for small economies, as they are subject to shocks from the domestic economy as well as from the rest of the world.
This paper attempts to shed light on these questions by studying the Singaporean housing market. Several justifications are in order. First, Singapore experienced the AFC and resumed economic growth soon after. 3 This enables us to study the "mean-reversion" behavior of the economy and the asset markets. Second, consistent with casual observations, previous studies have confirmed that the Singaporean economy is significantly affected by external shocks. 4 Third, some recent studies suggest that there is a "balance sheet channel" for a shock to propagate in the Singaporean macro-economy, as well as those of other Asian countries.
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In addition, the specific approach of this paper will complement existing studies on 1 The literature on the cause of the AFC is too large to be reviewed here. Among others, see the review of Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001), Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998), Mera and Renaud (2000) and the reference therein. 2 Clearly, it is beyond the scope of this paper to review that literature. Among others, see Bossaerts and Hillion (1999), David and Fagan (1997) 3 Among others, see Tse and Leung (2002) , Devereux (2003) . 4 Among others, see Abeysinghe (1998) , Cheung and Yuen (2002) , Mackowiak (2007) , Meng (2003) . 5 "Balance sheet channel" includes "maturity mismatch risk," "currency mismatch risk," "capital strcture mismatch risk," etc. The theoretical analysis of "balance sheet channel" can be found in Aghion Singapore. Existing studies on the Singaporean macro-economy typically ignore real estate market and existing studies on the Singaporean real estate market tend to take a micro-approach. 6 As a result, the dynamic interactions between the real estate market and the aggregate economy are under-explored. This paper joins this emerging literature by taking a macro-econometric approach. In particular, it takes a regime-switching structural vector-regressive (RS-SVAR) approach. Our choice of econometric modeling reflects our vision on how U.S. and other external factors and the Singapore macroeconomy may have complicated interactions within the Singaporean housing market. Figure 1 provides an oversight of that vision. First, the U.S. factors are expected to affect the Singaporean macro-economy, as confirmed by several previous studies. The macro-economic variables may have some complicated interactions among themselves. They will then affect the housing market. This is the indirect channel. The direct channel would clearly be the U.S. factors directly affecting the Singaporean housing market.
To implement these complicated interactions, this paper will take a two-stage approach. The first stage is to estimate how the U.S. factors and the world oil price affect the Singaporean macro-economy. The second stage is to estimate how the Singaporean macro-economy and other external factors affect housing returns in Singapore. We will provide more details in the next section.
( Sims and Zha (2006) , among others. As we do not know a priori which part of the model will displace regime-switching, we consider several specifications and examine their performance. Our choice of using the VAR approach is motivated by the 6 It is beyond the scope of this paper to review that literature. Among others, see Ong (2008) .
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fact that the reduced form of a dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE) can typically be represented by a VAR model, 7 . Third, there is increasing evidence of non-trivial dynamics among the macroeconomic variables, real estate variables and financial variables. 8 Our empirical model thus includes both macroeconomic variables and financial variables and studies how they affect the housing market.
Our paper also complements a recent study by Hwang and Lum (2009) (HL hereafter). HL extends the GMM approach advocated by Hansen (1982) , and estimates the codependent dynamics of housing and stock market returns in Singapore. As the GMM approach begins with the dynamic optimization of a representative agent, it enables HL to provide a nice structural interpretation of the parameters. This paper, in contrast, takes a structural VAR approach, interpreting that as the reduced form dynamics of a DSGE model. In particular, the regime-switching approach of this paper allows for the possibility of a regime-dependent response of housing returns to the stock market return and other macroeconomic variables, which is confirmed in our estimation. The approach of this paper also allows us to separate the direct impact from the impact of U.S. factors on the Singaporean housing market, and from their indirect counterparts that translate through the Singaporean macro-economy. Clearly, the two papers have very different foci and should be interpreted as complementary.
The structure of this paper is simple. The next section explains in detail the estimation strategies and the empirical models, and is followed by a section that describes the data.
The results are then presented. The final section concludes the paper. Our empirical investigation has two stages. As we want to separate the influence of external and internal factors on the Singaporean housing market, our first task is to extract the movements of Singaporean aggregate variables net of the effects from the U.S.
and the rest of the world. Specifically, we obtain the residuals f    by estimating the following  () model:
where
0 is the vector of Singapore's growth rate of real GDP, real stock return, growth rate of real amount of trade, and growth rate of nominal exchange
0 is the vector of the U.S. growth rate of real GDP, real stock return, federal funds rate (FFR), the external finance premium (EFP), and the TED spread;    represents the effects from the rest of the world: change rate of oil price; f    is the vector of residuals; and  0 is a 4 × 1 vector,  1 is a 4 × 5 vector, and  2 is a 4 × 1 vector: Chang, Chen and Leung (2010b) 
The Markov switching process relates the probability that regime  prevails in  to the prevailing regime
The transition probabilities are assumed to be fixed and the transition matrix of the Singaporean economy is given by:
where  1 and  2 are parameters to be estimated.
As the state of the economy is unobservable, we identify the regime for given a time period by the Hamilton (1994) smoothed probability approach, in which the probability of being state   at time  is given by  (  | Ω  ). Given that we assume the state of nature shifts between two regimes in both economies, i.e.,   ∈  = {1 2}, we identify the economy most likely to be in state
A merit of the regime-switching model is that within each regime the model is linear, which is consistent with the evidence of short-run predictability. On the other hand, the stochastic switching among regimes would make long-run profitability difficult, which is consistent with the evidence of (long-run) market efficiency. 9 Another merit of the model is that the volatility of shocks, the "responsiveness" of the system to the shocks, the persistence of variables, among others, can be time-varying. Thus, the regime-switching model does allow for a more flexible structure. In this paper, we take a further step by allowing various combinations of coefficients of the regime-switching model to be regimedependent. Depending on whether a coefficient or a group of coefficients are subject to regime switching, we consider a total of nine specifications of models, labeled Model 1 to 9 Among others, see Chang, Chen and Leung (2010a) for more discussion on this point.
7
Model 9, as listed in the appendix. Model 1 is a single-regime model:
in which all coefficients are constants. On the other hand, the model (2), labeled as Model 9, is the most general specification, in which all coefficients are regime-dependent.
Data
The empirical analysis of this paper is based on Singaporean and the U.S. data covering the period 19841 − 20102 the longest time series for both countries accessible to the authors. To be compatible with the house price index that is available quarterly, variables that were originally available monthly are transformed into quarterly variables.
The definitions and sources of data are summarized in Table 1 .
[ Table 1 about here]
The data from Singapore were taken from the Singaporean Department of Statistics.
The amount of trade is defined as the sum of total exports and imports. There is a major residential property price index and other five sub-indices available. As shown in Figure   2a and Table 2 , they exhibit the same pattern of dynamics and their pairwise correlations are extremely high. In the following, we use the aggregate residential property price index (HP 1) as our measure of Singapore's housing price index. Real GDP, real stock index, and real amount of trade are deflated by CPI. We compute stock and housing returns by taking the growth rates of the stock price index and housing price index respectively.
[ Figure 2a , Table 2 Table 3 gives a statistical description of Singapore's housing returns, which
shows that the volatility of housing returns is extremely large. With a mean growth rate of 3916%, it oscillates between the maximum and the minimum (35143%, −40194%)
during its sample periods.
[ Table 2b 
Baseline Results
We first extract residuals of Singapore's economic aggregates by estimating the model (1), and then proceed to estimate the dynamics of Singapore's housing returns from Model 1 to Model 9.
The estimation results of the model (1) are listed in Table A -1 of the appendix. We then plot the residuals from the estimation, i.e., Singapore's GDP, stock return, total amount of trade, and the nominal exchange rate after controlling for the effects of the U.S. and the rest of the world, in the dotted lines of Figure 2 .
10 The widely-used BBA LIBOR, compiled by the British Bankers' Association, started only from January 1986. Therefore, we replace the 3-month LIBOR rate by 3-month Eurodollar deposit rate.
These two series are highly correlated. 
Determinants of the Dynamics of Housing Returns
The residuals from estimating the model (1) are plugged into the Singapore's housing return equation. We then estimate Model 1 to 9. The estimation results are shown in Table A -2 of the appendix .
The regime-dependent means of housing returns for Models 2 to 9 are listed in Table   4 . Clearly, the mean of housing returns in regime 2 is much lower than that of regime 1 for all models. In fact, in six out of eight regime-switching models the mean returns are negative. Hence, we label regime 2 as the bust regime and regime 1 as the boom regime.
The transition probabilities for Models 2 and 9, as shown in Table 5 , vary widely across models.
Given the estimated parameters, transition probabilities, and variance-covariance matrix, we compute the smoothed probabilities of the bust regime for Models 2 to 9, as shown in Figure 4 and Table 6 . With different model specifications, the identified bust periods are very much different across models. In particular, in Models 8 and 9, where almost all parameters are assumed to be subject to regime switching, the shifts of regimes are very frequent. It is evident from Table 5 that the transition probabilities of these two models are much lower than others. From these results, we gain a glimpse of possible errors if a model is mis-specified.
[ Table 4 -6]
[ Figure 4 ]
How do we choose a winner from among these nine models? A criterion is to compare the performances of their in-sample forecasts. We compute two widely-used measures for forecasting housing returns    : mean square errors () and mean absolute errors (), which are defined respectively as
Clearly, MSE tends to penalize "big mistakes" more than the MAE. As will be clear, our main conclusions do not depend on whether MSE or MAE is used.
We compute both the MSE and MAE of in-sample -step ahead forecasts,  = 1  4, across all models, and the results are displayed in Table 9 . Several interesting observations are in order. First, we find that, regardless of whether MSE or MAE are used, Model 5 has the best in-sample forecasting performance among these eight regime-switching models, followed by Model 6. Specifically, Model 5 is specified as
i.e., only the intercepts and coefficients of Singapore's "net" economic aggregates and of the U.S. macroeconomic variables are regime-dependent. Figure 5 plots the movements of housing returns in Singapore and its predicted values under Model 5. We can see that
Model 5 is able to capture the dynamics of the housing returns closely.
Second, most regime-switching models have higher MSE and MAE than the linear model (Model 1). This suggests that taking account of regime switching may yield worse results than a linear model if the model is mis-specified.
[ Table 9 ]
[ Figure 5 ]
Given that Model 5 has the best in-sample forecasting, Table 10 displays its estimation results. There are several notable findings. First, Singapore's GDP has a significantly negative effect on its housing return in the boom regime, while the GDP of U.S. has a positive effect on Singapore's housing return in boom regime and a negative effect in bust regime. 11 To understand this result, we first plot the movements of the housing returns of both countries in Figure 6 . Note that the dynamics of Singapore's housing returns are much more volatile than those of the U.S., and the patterns of housing return movements are also very different in the two economies. For example, in the last ten years Singapore's housing returns rose to almost 30% and did not decline until late 2007. The decline in housing returns following the subprime crisis was very deep, but starting in early 2009 the housing market rebounded at an astonishing pace, while the U.S. housing market was still staggering.
That a positive shock can lead to a negative response in the housing return may sound counter-intuitive, but we attempt to provide an explanation here. A good shock of GDP growth at time  leads to an immediate appreciation of house prices, as the housing supply is fixed in the short run. Over time, however, the supply can respond. It may be even more pronounced in Singapore as the Singaporean government is often pro-active. Thus, as the shock dies down, the future increase in house price will not be as much. Therefore, the time  increase in house price could be larger than those in subsequent periods, leading to time  housing returns () being higher than time  + 1 returns ( + 1). Moreover, according to the regime-classification provided by our regime-switching model, when the Singapore's housing returns are in the boom regime, the U.S. housing market stays in the bust regime. This is consistent with the notion that U.S. investors tend to diversify their portfolios internationally.
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Second, stock market fluctuations in Singapore will affect the housing market, but only in the bust regime. This indicates that the spillover effect of the financial market strengthens in a bear market. Third, a rise in the total amount of trade and an appreciation in exchange rate leads to higher housing returns. This is intuitive because Singapore has been running trade surpluses, and larger trade surpluses lead to an appreciation in the exchange rate. These two effects together bring in more foreign capital, leading to domestic asset prices rises. and risk premium of the U.S., especially in the boom regime. Finally, the U.S. stock market and the oil price do not have significant effects on Singapore's housing market. Figure 7 shows the impulse responses of the Singapore housing returns to innovation in equation (2) across different models. Interestingly, they all show a large initial response that diminishes almost completely within two years.
[ Table 10 about here]
[ Figure 6 , 7 about here]
Diebold and Mariano Test
On top of the MAE and MSE statistics, we can also directly measure whether one model predicts statistically significantly better than an alternative. Following the literature, we adopt the Diebold-Mariano test to assess the "relative performance" of different models. 
where (·) is a loss function. Clearly, if the two models have roughly the same predictive power, the expectation of the loss differential will be zero,  [  ] = 0 If, instead, Model 1 predicts better (worse) model 2, the expected value of the loss differential will be positive (negative).
14 The results are not very satisfactory. Model 5 statistically out-performs Models 9 and 10, but not the others. One possible explanation is that the time series is relatively short. Data availability constrains us from considering a more sophisticated model.
[ Table 11 about here]
4 Robustness Checks
Single Stage Estimation
As a direct comparison with Model 5, we estimate it again using Singapore's economic aggregates without controlling for foreign effects. That is, we estimate the following Model 5A:
Note that the difference between this model and Model 5 is that the term f    in (4) is now replaced by    which is the vector of Singapore's economic aggregates that contain noises from the U.S. and the rest of the world. By doing so, we forego the stage one estimation and proceed to Stage two directly. Figure 8 clearly shows that, without accounting for noises from the U.S. and the rest of the world, the regimes identified according to the Markov process switch much more frequently. Table 15 shows that Model 5A performs marginally better than Model 5 in terms of MSE, but Model 5A performs far worse than Model 5 in terms of MAE. Table 16 compares the estimation results of these two models. Distinct features are evident in accounting for the dynamic properties of Singapore's housing returns between these two models. Importantly, this shows exactly why our two-stage approach matters.
For example, the U.S. stock price and the oil price do not affect Singapore's housing returns after accounting for the interactions of macroeconomic variables between Singapore, the U.S., and the rest of the world (Model 5). However, the U.S. stock price and the oil price appear to have significant effects on those housing returns under Model 5A.
In other words, the U.S. stock price and the oil price in the world market only affect the Singaporean housing market by affecting the domestic aggregate variables, an indirect effect. The drawback of a single stage approach such as Model 5A is that it does not help the reader to separate direct and indirect effects. In contrast, our two-stage approach is able to disentangle the complicated interaction effects and clearly identify the sources of fluctuation in Singapore's housing returns.
[ 
An Alternative Modeling Strategy
In this subsection, we estimate an alternative model that makes two important changes to the benchmark model. First, in the benchmark model, we include only four of Singapore's macroeconomic variables in the stage one estimation, i.e., 
0 includes the growth rate of real GDP, real stock return, growth rate of real amount of trade, and growth rate of nominal exchange rate. We now expand the set of variables by including a fifth element, Singapore's housing returns, so that 
0 is a 5 × 1 vector. We obtain the residuals f    from the estimation. Second, in the stage two estimation, we consider the following model
where   (  ) is a 5 × 5 matrix. As compared to (4), the stage two estimation includes no macroeconomic variables of the U.S. and the rest of the world. (6) attempts to maximize the matching between the model and the "filtered data," not only the housing return, but the whole vector of the filtered data (i.e. including the Singaporean GDP growth rate, stock return, etc.). Nonetheless, some of our colleagues insist us to estimate the Alternative Model because it may be statistically more general. Table 17 lists the stage two estimation results for housing returns.
[ Table 17 about here]
Concluding Remarks
Given the increasing interdependence of economies in recent decades, the potential significance of the international transmission of fluctuations in economic activity and financial markets has gained attention. In many Asian countries, it is a very important concern for both academics and policy makers. On the one hand, most Asian countries are still developing, and openness to international trade and capital flows can be vital to continued economic growth. On the other hand, international exposure in trade and financial services may imply higher volatility in economic growth, and even social conflict in some cases. This quotation highlights a few facts. First, Singapore has experienced financial crises and its economy is still growing. Second, while GDP can fall a few percentage points on an annual basis during a crisis, the stock price can lose half of its value. As other authors have studied the dynamics between the Singaporean economy and its stock market, this paper focuses on Singapore's housing market dynamics. We investigate how external shocks (for instance, from the U.S.) as well as internally generated shocks are transmitted to the housing market. Our principal finding that the responses of housing returns significantly differ across regimes is important. From the best model we can identify (Model 5), we find that during the boom regime, the housing return responds negatively to the GDP growth rate and the exchange rate fluctuations in Singapore dollars, and to the Federal Fund rate and the External Finance Premium of the U.S. Perhaps more interestingly, the responses of Singaporean housing returns to these factors are not statistically significant during the bust regime. One interpretation is that during the boom regime, these factors will stimulate the current period housing price more than the subsequent period price, which will tend to depress returns. Why would the housing price of the current period respond differently to those factors from the subsequent periods during the boom regime? One possible explanation is that during the current period, the supply is fixed and the current period price tends to respond sharply. Yet the same sharp increase in price also stimulates the housing supply in subsequent periods, which tends to suppress future price growth. The question is then why this mechanism fails to operate during the bust regime. One explanation is that during the bust regime, both households and developers are very cautious, or process information very differently, which may affect the equilibrium responses in house price and the housing supply. If this is indeed the case, this paper provides indirect support to theories that emphasize different attitudes of households and firms across regimes. Those differences can be caused by financial constraints, beliefs, behavioral factors, allocation of attention or other factors. 16 Future research should explore how to identify the reasons behind the different responses.
An alternative explanation is that the government behaves very differently across regimes. However, this is not easy to verify in the current framework. In fact, this city-making has a special meaning. It is not just about solving the problems of a big city or addressing the challenges it faces. It is an "aggressive" policy of making it..."
Future research should take a more "structural approach" to separately identifying the response from the private sector versus the public sector. That will enable us to evaluate the effectiveness of different government policies, which could lead to very important research results for both policy makers and academic researchers in Asia. 16 It is beyond the scope of this paper to review this emerging literature, among others, see Brunnermeier Table 2 Ex-R Ex-R-tutta
Note: "GDP" refers to GDP growth. "S" refers to the stock returns. "Trade" refers to growth rate of real amount of international trade. "Ex-R" refers to growth rate of exchange rate. "X-tutta" refers to the X variable after controlling for US and world variables. Note: "GDP" refers to GDP growth. "S" refers to the stock returns. "FFR" refers to federal fund rate. "EFP" refers to the external finance premium. "TED" refers to TED spread. "Oil" refers to oil price change. Key: "Correl" refers to Correlation; "(H,GDP)" refers to (House Return, GDP growth); "(H,S)" refers to (House Return, Stock Price Change); "(H,Trade)" refers to (House Return, Real Amount of International growth rate); "(H,EX-R)" refers to (House Return, Exchange Rate Change) Oil price growth rate -0.011
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. Key: Notice that the Alternative model tries to match the "filtered data" and the other models in the text attempt to match the raw data. Hence they are not directly comparable. Nevertheless, we put the corresponding figures together in a table for reference. 5 1985Q1-1985Q3 1987Q3-1992Q2 1997Q3-1998Q4 2002Q1-2008Q4 5A 1984Q4 1986Q2 1987Q1 1987Q3-1987Q4 1989Q4 1990Q3-1991Q3 1992Q2 1993Q1 1993Q4 1995Q2-1995Q3 1996Q1 1996Q3-1998Q4 Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. Note:*** Statistically significant at 1% level. * Statistically significant at 10% level.
Key: Notice that the Model 5 is to forecast the future housing return, while Alternative model is to forecast the future "filtered" housing return. Thus, a direct comparison of the forecasting ability of Model 5A and Alternative is inappropriate.
APPENDIX

A Nine specifications of Models
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
Model 9
Appendix B
This appendix provides details of the regression results discussed in the text. Note: *** Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at 5% level. * Statistically significant at 10% level.
